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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
William Patrick Giltz appeals from the judgment and sentence entered upon the jury verdict
finding him guilty of felony domestic battery.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
A.

The State’s Case-In-Chief
The following facts underlying Giltz’s conviction for felony domestic battery are based on

the testimony presented at trial in the state’s case-in-chief.

1.

Jeff Spilde’s Testimony

Jeff Spilde lived in a two-bedroom “trailer house” in Meridian since August of 2015. (Tr.,
p.142, L.17 – p.143, L.8.) The bedrooms were on opposite ends of the trailer. (Tr., p.143, Ls. 1521.) In December of 2016, Spilde lived in the trailer with Giltz and his girlfriend, L.B., whom he
met through an ad he posted on Craigslist for someone to rent a room. (Tr., p.144, Ls.3-13; p.146,
Ls.9-18; p.149, Ls.17-20.) Although Spilde interacted with Giltz and L.B. “a little bit” whenever
they came out to visit, he did not socialize with them outside the trailer. (Tr., p.151, Ls.7-18.)
Spilde noticed that L.B. was always helping Giltz out with making food, and being “really nice to
him” like most girlfriends are. (Tr., p.151, Ls.21-25.)
At about 4:00 a.m. on December 28, 2016, Spilde woke up when he heard screaming from
L.B.; she was yelling for him, “Help.” (Tr., p.152, Ls.2-16.) When Spilde went into the hallway,
he saw Giltz “in the living room and [L.B.] was in front of the door” to her bedroom “all bloodied
up.” (Tr., p.152, Ls.19-25; p.154, Ls.6-10.) Spilde testified: “It looked like [L.B.’s] face had
gotten smashed. She had blood all over her face and bleeding everywhere, all over the floor and
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walls. I could see it was on the door, too.” (Tr., p.155, Ls.6-9.) L.B. appeared to be angry,
shocked, and mad “because she got hit[,]” but she did not “aggress or try to go toward [Giltz].”
(Tr., p.155, Ls.10-15.) Giltz, on the other hand, did not have any injuries that were apparent to
Spilde, and he (Giltz) did not act like he was hurt at all. (Tr., p.155, Ls. 16-20.) The couple were
yelling at each other, and Giltz “went towards her a couple times, but she would use her foot to
kind of just, ‘Get away from me,’ to say, ‘Get away from me[,]’” but Spilde did not see her make
contact with Giltz. (Tr., p.155, L.23 – p.156, L.18.) Spilde told Giltz to “just stay back and leave
her alone and sit down,” but Giltz did not comply until after Spilde repeated his command. (Tr.,
p.157, Ls. 5-8.) Spilde told Giltz that “they both can leave,” and to “get out.” (Tr., p.156, L.23 –
p.157, L.8.) During this time, L.B. was yelling and staying at the door trying to hold a rag on her
face, which was still actively bleeding. (Tr., p.157, Ls.14-23.) Spilde was able to get Giltz to
leave the trailer about an hour, or hour and a half, after Spilde came out of his bedroom. (Tr.,
p.158, Ls. 2-7.)
After Giltz left the trailer, L.B. went into the bathroom, cleaned her face, and continued to
hold a rag over it. (Tr., p.159, Ls.7-12.) While L.B. was in the bathroom trying to stop the
bleeding, she cleaned up a lot of the blood herself. (Tr., p.160, L.21 – p.161, L.1.) L.B. eventually
called a friend to take her to the hospital. (Tr., p.159, Ls.14-16.) Spilde did not call the police
right away because L.B. asked him not to, so he waited until she left the trailer to call the police.
(Tr., p.159, L.17 – p.160, L.4.; p.163, Ls.18-23.) The next day L.B. returned to the trailer, where
she continued to live for about a month, until Spilde asked her to move out because of nonpayment. (Tr., p.161, L.18 – p.162, L.1.)
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2.

Stephen Kingsley’s Testimony

Stephen Kingsley testified that he knew L.B. through work and that he met Giltz through
her. (Tr., p.166, L.25 – p.167, L.11.) Kingsley would engage in “horse trading” for electronics
and computer-related items with Giltz, who “knew his laptops.” (Tr., p.168, L.8 – p.169, L.3.)
Kingsley did not socialize with Giltz, but Giltz and L.B. both knew how to contact him. (Tr.,
p.169, Ls.8-16)
In the early morning of December 28, 2016, Kingsley received a call for help from L.B.
(Tr., p.170, Ls.2-10.) Later that morning L.B. sent Kingsley a picture of her face, and he drove to
her trailer to help her. (Tr., p.170, Ls.11-17.) When he arrived at the trailer, Giltz was not there,
and L.B. looked “[l]ike somebody beat the hell out of her,” so Kingsley took her to the hospital
and “told her to check in and call the police.” (Tr., p.170, L.18 – p.171, L.3.) Later that day, a
“victim’s advocate” called Kingsley and asked him to give L.B. a ride back to “where she needed
to stay[,]” but L.B. did not feel comfortable going back to the trailer, so Kingsley rented her a
motel room, and did not see her again until the next day when he went to the trailer to check on
her. (Tr., p.171, L.6 – p.172, L.2.)

3.

Officer Natalie Chopko’s Testimony

Meridian Police Officer Natalie Chopko testified that, on the morning of December 28,
2016, she was initially dispatched to the trailer, but was redirected to go to a hospital emergency
room to contact L.B. (Tr., p.174, L.10 – p.176, L.4.) When Officer Chopko first saw L.B., she
was sitting in a wheelchair “bleeding profusely from the face[,]” and her eyes were “severely
swollen with bruising” and “her lips were both swollen.” (Tr., p.176, Ls.12-15.) L.B. was crying
while she held a bloody rag to her face. (Tr., p.176, Ls.15-16.) Officer Chopko accompanied L.B.
when she was in a treatment room, and the officer took photos of her while she was laying in the
3

hospital bed. (Tr., p.176, L.17 – p.179, L.24; see St. Exs. 3, 6-11.) Officer Chopko sent two
officers to the trailer to take photos there. (Tr., p.182, Ls.13-15.) When a doctor asked L.B. about
her vision, L.B. reported that it was blurry, and her left eye was worse than her right eye. (Tr.,
p.176, L.25 – p. 177, L.6.)
L.B. told Officer Chopko that Giltz was the person who battered her, and when she received
a phone call from him, the officer requested that L.B. turn on the speaker phone so she could hear
his responses. (Tr., p.180, L.23 – p.181, L.13.) During the phone conversation between Giltz and
L.B., Giltz did not say anything about L.B. attacking him or having a knife and wielding it at him,
or anything about having to defend himself against her. (Tr., p.181, Ls.14-22.) In that phone
conversation, L.B. did not indicate to Giltz that a police officer was present in the room with her,
nor did Officer Chopko converse with Giltz. (Tr., p.183, Ls.14-25.) Officer Chopko testified that
she could not make a phone call to Giltz because his phone was connected through WiFi only, and
he could call out, but not receive calls. (Tr., p.184, Ls.1-7.) After Officer Chopko interviewed
L.B., she left the hospital and contacted L.B. about 36 hours later and took more photos of her in
order to document any bruises on L.B. that might have shown up after the fact. (Tr., p.184, L.8 –
p.185, L.21; p.186, L.7 – p.189, L.20; see St. Exs. 12-21.)
Upon being re-called by the state, Officer Chopko testified that she had training and
experience in drug cases, had worked undercover and on the highway interdiction team, and had
“taken numerous classes for new emerging drugs, previous drugs, and drug sales and packaging.”
(Tr., p.252, Ls.7-16.) During her 11 years of experience, Officer Chopko had encountered subjects
under the influence of methamphetamine, and she explained that they typically exhibit
“uncontrolled movements that they don’t even know they’re unaware of, anywhere from the
slightest just gripping of their toes in flip-flops that you can see, and to the more exaggerating
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jerking, uncontrollably scratching at their face, clenching of the jaw, moving their jaws around,
their eyes will be dilated because it’s a stimulant.” (Tr., p.252, L.17 – p.253, L.12.) When asked
if L.B. exhibited any of those signs of being under the influence of methamphetamine before she
received any treatment or medication by hospital staff, Officer Chopko said, “No, she did not.”
(Tr., p.253, L.21 – p.254, L.1.) Similarly, Officer Chopko testified that she was aware that persons
who are IV drug users have “track marks, which is scarring of the vein which is where they use
intravenously over and over in the same spot,” and agreed that track marks are often seen on the
insides of the wrists or the forearms. (Tr., p.254, Ls.7-16.) However, the officer did not see any
signs that L.B. had track marks. (Tr., p.254, L.17 – p.255, L.3; see St. Exs. 22, 23.)

4.

L.B.’s Testimony

L.B. testified that she and Giltz dated on and off for about six to ten years, and they began
living together at a trailer on West Cherry Lane in Meridian during their last stint of dating at some
point between August and December, 2016. (Tr., p.194, L.5 – p.195, L.21; p.196, L.21 –p.197,
L.3.) During that timeframe, Giltz was not working, and the couple supported themselves on his
social security. (Tr., p.196, Ls.7-15.) The trailer L.B. and Giltz moved into was owned and
occupied by Jeff Spilde, but she did not know Spilde before that time. (Tr., p.196, Ls.1-24.)
On December 27, 2016, Giltz was upset because his vehicle was having mechanical
problems as he and L.B. drove home, but he was able to get it to “limp back to the trailer.” (Tr.,
p.197, L.7 – p.198, L.3.) L.B. and Giltz were “hanging out” in the bedroom, and she watched him
work on computers. (Tr., p.199, Ls.14-23.) As L.B. was laying on the bed watching television,
she fell asleep, but was subsequently woken up by Giltz who told her “to go fix him something to
eat.” (Tr., p.200, Ls.5-17.) Because it was the only food they had, L.B. went into the kitchen and
prepared tuna and macaroni and cheese, and took it to Giltz in the bedroom. (Tr., p.200, L.20 –
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p.201, L.5.) When Giltz took a bite of the food, he yelled at L.B. and threw the food against the
wall. (Tr., p.201, L.23 – p.202, L.2.) L.B. was shocked that Giltz did that, and noted that Giltz
was “pretty upset” and went into the kitchen and “threw the pan and everything in the trash.” (Tr.,
p.203, L.7 – p.204, L.2.) L.B. sat on the bed, and Giltz came back to the bedroom and shut the
door, still yelling at her. (Tr., p.204, Ls.4-6.) L.B. laid on the bed and told Giltz she was going
back to sleep. (Tr., p.204, Ls.10-11.)
L.B. testified that she thought she went to sleep, and the next thing she remembered was
that Giltz woke her up and asked her to “go get a bowl of weed from the people next door[,]” and
she told him, “if he wanted a bowl of weed to go get it himself.” (Tr., p.204, L.20 – p.205, L.9.)
Giltz then said, “Don’t you ever talk to me like that again, bitch,” and hit L.B. “in [her] face” while
she was lying in the bed. (Tr., p.205, Ls.12-17; p.225, Ls.9-16; p.233, L.20 - p.234, L.19.) When
L.B. was asked if she knew “if it was an open-handed or a close-handed punch,” L.B. answered,
“It was close-handed.” (Tr., p.226, L.24 – p.227, L.3.) L.B. testified that she did not have a knife,
and did not threaten Giltz with anything that could have been perceived as a knife. (Tr., p.227,
Ls.4-8.)
L.B. did not recall how many times Giltz hit her, or if she lost consciousness. (Tr., p.206,
Ls.6-16; p.208, Ls.17-19; p.233, L.20 – p.234, L.19.) However, L.B. recalled “some” of being in
the hospital a couple hours after the incident, and that Officer Chopko was there. (Tr., p.206, L.17
– p.207, L.1.) L.B. testified that she had reviewed Officer Chopko’s video recording of the
officer’s conversation with her at the hospital, and adopted “that what [she] said was truthful[,]”
and that she had told the officer that Giltz “punched her three times[.]” (Tr., p.207, L.6 – p.208,
L.16.) L.B. testified that, after Giltz hit her she kicked at him and tried to crawl away on the bed
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as he tried to grab her. (Tr., p.208, L.23 – p.209, L.7; p.214, L.3 – p.215, L.3.) L.B. did not recall
if any of her kicks made contact with Giltz. (Tr., p.215, Ls.4-6.)
L.B.’s face was bleeding profusely, her blood was “everywhere” – on her clothing, on the
bedding, on the floor, and on the walls – and she “couldn’t even breathe.” (Tr., p.215, L.7 – p.217,
L.12; see St. Ex. 5 (blanket).) L.B. “went through several towels” and took a shower to try to stop
the bleeding, but she was not able to do so. (Tr., p.219, Ls.1-20.) She also put her clothing in the
washing machine. (Tr., p.219, Ls.11-13.) L.B. did not call the police, nor did she want Spilde to
call the police, because Giltz had told her that there were warrants out for her arrest – which she
later determined was not true. (Tr., p.221, L.12 – p.222, L.13.) Giltz was no longer at the trailer
when L.B. decided that she needed to go to the hospital, so she called Stephen Kingsley to ask him
to take her there. (Tr., p.219, L.21 – p.220, L.7.) L.B. did not recall getting “a number of CT
scans” while at the hospital, nor did she remember what the doctor told her about her injuries. (Tr.,
p.227, Ls.9-17.) However, she did recall that, when she was discharged from the hospital, she
was instructed to see an ear, nose, and throat specialist, and an eye specialist because she needed
reconstructive surgery on her nose and her eye. (Tr., p.228, L.12 – p.229, L.7.) Although L.B.
eventually received surgery on her nose, she did not have surgery on her eye because “there was
no more funding through the victim’s compensation program.” (Tr., p.229, L.8 – p.230, L.11.)
L.B. testified that she and Giltz routinely (“all day long”) would smoke marijuana, and,
although she initially said it was “very likely” she smoked marijuana that day, during crossexamination she admitted that she smoked marijuana with a pipe on the night before the incident.
(Tr., p.225, L.17 – p.226, L.3; p.236, Ls.8-15; p.239, Ls.6-9.) However, L.B. testified that she had
not used any other drugs that day, including methamphetamine. (Tr., p.236, Ls.13-20.)
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5.

Dr. Ashley King’s Testimony

Dr. Ashley King is a board certified family medicine physician for St. Luke’s health
system, and the medical director for the sexual assault forensic examiner team at the Faces of Hope
Victim’s Center (“FACES”). (Tr., p.268, L.12 – p.271, L.8.) Dr. King is also a sexual assault
forensic examiner herself. (Tr., p.271, Ls.5-6.) Dr. King examined L.B. on February 8, 2017.
(Tr., p.277, Ls.5-9.) L.B. was concerned about her nose, and reported that she had difficulty
breathing and was unable to even wear glasses on the bridge of her nose. (Tr., p.277, Ls.16-23.)
A maxillofacial CT scan of L.B. revealed that L.B. had a fractured nose; “a certain type of fracture
called a comminuted fracture. That actually means that the nose is not just a slight fracture, but
there are actual multiple different pieces because of that impact fracture.” (Tr., p.278, Ls.10-20.)
Dr. King testified that, through the use of an otoscope to look inside L.B.’s nose, she could see
“that the septum, the kind of middle dividing structure of the nose itself, was markedly deviated.”
(Tr., p.282, Ls.5-9.)
Dr. King further testified that L.B. suffered a “left orbital rim defect, the orbit being kind
of the bony eye socket[,]” and “quite a bit of soft tissue swelling” on the cheekbone on the left
side. (Tr., p.278, L.20 – p.279, L.9.)
The staff at FACES helped L.B. get a referral with Southwest Idaho Ear, Nose, and Throat
(“ENT”) because L.B. had not followed up with earlier emergency room referral for such an
examination because she was concerned about the cost. (Tr., p.279, L.24 – p.280, L.19.) Dr. King
subsequently received records from Southwest ENT showing that L.B. had undergone “some
reconstructive surgery on her nose” the month after she examined L.B. (Tr., p.283, L.16 – p.284,
L.15.) Southwest ENT categorized L.B.’s orbital rim injury as “a left orbital rim fracture.” (Tr.,
p.284, L.20 – p.285, L.2.)
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B.

The Defense Case-In-Chief: Giltz’s Testimony
Giltz was the sole witness on his behalf. He testified that, on the night of the incident, L.B.

made him “macaroni, like a tuna salad which is actually my favorite,” and he ate it. (Tr., p.295,
L.7 – p.296, L.3.) L.B. was in the bathroom and Giltz offered to smoke a bowl of marijuana with
her, but she said “no” in a “really strange voice.” (Tr., p.296, Ls.13-21.) Giltz got up to see what
L.B. was doing, and when he looked in, he saw L.B. standing in front of the mirror with a syringe
of methamphetamine in her neck, which puzzled him because they usually shared
methamphetamine together. (Tr., p.297, L.8 - p.298, L.18.) Giltz became very upset with the
“whole meth use,” as he was “more of a traditional marijuana user” who “never really cared for
the drug meth.” (Tr., p.298, Ls.19-25.) However, he testified that, “[t]he times that we’ve been –
me and [L.B.] have been together, I have been involved with methamphetamines with her.” (Tr.,
p.298, L.25 – p.299, L.2.) Giltz was upset when he saw the needle in the side of L.B.’s neck and
told her to get out of the house, he wanted her to leave. (Tr., p.299, Ls.3-7.) L.B. finished injecting
the drug into her jugular vein, and grabbed the counter and started to shake. (Tr., p.299, Ls.9-14.)
He again told L.B. to get out. (Tr., p.299, Ls.15-19.)
Giltz testified that L.B. turned and grabbed something from the counter which looked like
a sharp, shiny medal object, and “did a full turn on [him] and made an attempt to stab [him].” (Tr.,
p.299, L.21 – p.300, L.1.) Giltz explained that he had many years of self-defense practice – his
specialties being tai kwon do and jujitsu. (Tr., p.300, Ls.4-9.) In the following dialogue, Giltz
explained what events followed L.B.’s attempt to stab him:
I acted in a defensive mode by grabbing what she had in her hand, and she
wouldn’t let go of it. And I said to her let go of it. She wouldn’t let go of it. She
was still attempting to try to subdue me with it. So I open-palmed her with one
hand, like that.
Q. And during that, did she release the object in her hand?
9

A. The object actually broke, and it was in my hand. And she had the other half
of it. I am thinking maybe it was a pair of scissors, or something, because it actually
broke.
At that point, after subduing and hurting her, I backed off and I started
backing out of the room.
(Tr., p.300, L.21 – p.301, L.10.)
Giltz explained that, after he struck her, L.B. came at him “like a rage,” charging him with
her head down, swinging her fists, so he made another defensive move and did a “spread eagle” to
flatten her out on the ground as she screamed at him. (Tr., p.302, L.17 – p.303, L.23.) At that
point, Jeff Spilde showed up and L.B. started yelling, “Jeff. Jeff. Help. Help.” (Tr., p.304, Ls.613.) Giltz told Spilde that L.B. had gone crazy and was taking methamphetamines, but did not tell
him that she had attacked him with a knife or scissors. (Tr., p.330, Ls.11-19.) After Spilde told
Giltz to leave the trailer, Giltz gathered up some items and put them in a laptop bag, then he walked
to the freeway and “thumbed it to Nampa.” (Tr., p.333, L.7 – p.334, L.8.) Giltz did not help L.B.
with her injuries, although he “was a little concerned” about them and advised Spilde that she was
“hurt really badly” and “need[ed] to go to the hospital.” (Tr., p.334, Ls.15-24.)

C.

The State’s Rebuttal Testimony
1.

Officer Michael Lipple

Boise Police Officer Michael Lipple testified that he was on duty on December 28, 2016,
when he was contacted by Officer Chopko, who requested that he go to a South Stapleton Lane
residence and check for a “Windstar” minivan that she believed belonged to Giltz. (Tr., p.342,
Ls.9-14.) When Officer Lipple went there, he saw the vehicle in the parking lot, unoccupied, so
he “parked down the road” and waited for an assist officer to arrive. (Tr., p.342, L.21 – p.343,
L.14.) When the assist officer arrived, the two officers went back to where the Windstar had been,
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but, in the words of Officer Lipple, “It had given me the slip.” (Tr., p.343, L.18 – p.344, L.3.)
Officer Lipple was not able to find the vehicle or Giltz. (Tr., p.344, Ls.4-6.)

2.

Jeffrey Spilde

Jeff Spilde testified on rebuttal that when he heard L.B. screaming, he ran down the hallway
and saw her standing in her doorway and Giltz standing by a love seat, but he did not see any knife
blade, knife handle, or anything in L.B.’s or Giltz’s hands. (Tr., p.345, L.19 – p.346, L.11.) From
the time of the incident and after Giltz left the residence, Spilde did not “see any parts of a knife
or something that could look like a knife anywhere in the area” that he was cleaning up. (Tr.,
p.347, Ls.3-22.) Spilde did not take the garbage out before the police arrived at the trailer, and he
did not see L.B. take the garbage out during that time either. (Tr., p.347, L.23 – p.348, L.3.)
Spilde testified that he did not observe “anything that would indicate . . . [L.B.] had used
methamphetamine[,]” and Giltz did not say anything about L.B. having used that drug. (Tr., p.346,
Ls.12-21.) Spilde did not see anything about L.B.’s behavior that caused him to suspect that she
was using methamphetamine. (Tr., p.346, L.22 – p.347, L.1.)

3.

Officer Ryan Rhoades

Meridian Police Officer Ryan Rhoades testified that he was on patrol when he responded
to the trailer on the morning of December 28, 2016, to take photographs. He took photos of blood
spots he could see in the bedroom and entryway, on the blanket and bedspread on the bed, and
some “splatter that hadn’t been cleaned up on the walls and doorjamb areas.” (Tr., p.352, Ls.416.). However, when he was preparing for the trial, he was unable to locate the photographs. (Tr.,
p.352, L.17 – p.353, L.5.) However, Officer Rhoades had a video that filmed “what he did there,”
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and showed him as he “walked through photographing items or manipulating items in the room,”
while he narrated what he was looking for. (Tr., p.353, Ls.9-16.)
During Officer Rhoades’s search of the bedroom, he did not find a knife, any other object
with a sharp blade, or “[a]ny other portions of something that maybe had a blade that – you know,
where it had been broken in half, for example[.]”, (Tr., p.353, L.17 – p.354, L.16.) The officer
also looked in the garbage bag that was in the bathroom area of the bedroom, and found bloody
tissues, but no knives or blades “of any type,” and no methamphetamine needles. (Tr., p.354, L.17
– p.355, L.9.) Finally, Officer Rhoades explained that he moved a number of items around in the
room, and did not find any needles. (Tr., p.355, Ls.10-17.)

D.

Course Of Proceedings
The state charged Giltz with felony domestic violence (with traumatic injury), and

subsequently filed an Information Part II, alleging Giltz was a persistent violator of the law. (R.,
pp.50-51, 96-97.)
Prior to trial, the district court held a hearing in which it ruled that, pursuant to I.R.E. 609,
the state could present evidence that Giltz had two prior “felony” convictions, and Giltz was free
to further explain to the jury that the convictions were for burglary. (Tr., p.17, Ls.11-17.) During
its deliberations at the end of trial, the jury sent the court three questions essentially asking whether
it had to determine if Giltz used a “closed fist” in order to be convicted. (R., p.140.) In response,
the court answered the jury’s questions orally, stating, “For the purposes of his case, it is not
necessary for you to decide whether the defendant struck with an open or closed fist.” (Tr., p.439,
Ls.3-25.)
The jury found Giltz guilty of felony domestic violence (R., p.141) and, after Giltz waived
his right to a jury trial on the persistent violator allegation (Tr., p.444, Ls.20-21), the district court
12

found that allegation had been proven (Tr., p.450, Ls.5-10). The court sentenced Giltz to a unified
term of 15 years with three years fixed. (R., pp.172-175.) Giltz timely appeals. (R., pp.178-180,
185-189.)
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ISSUES
Giltz states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by ruling the State could impeach
Mr. Giltz with his two prior felony convictions for burglary?

2.

Did the district court err in instructing the jury it was not necessary for it to
decide whether Mr. Giltz struck the victim with an open or closed fist?

(Appellant’s Brief, p.4.)
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1.

Has Giltz failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion by admitting
evidence showing he had two prior felony convictions?

2.

Has Giltz failed to show any error in the district court’s instruction to the jury that it was
not necessary to decide whether he struck the victim with an open or closed fist?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Giltz Has Failed To Demonstrate That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Admitting
Evidence Showing He Had Two Prior Felony Convictions
A.

Introduction
On appeal, Giltz does not challenge the relevancy of his prior burglary convictions, but

only claims that the district court abused its discretion by admitting such evidence under Idaho
Rule of Evidence 609 without determining “whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs
its prejudicial impact.” (Appellant’s Brief, p.8.) Giltz has failed to show that that district court
abused its discretion. Although the district court did not expressly engage in the weighing process
prescribed by Rule 609, it appears the court implicitly considered whether the prejudicial impact
was outweighed by the probative value of the evidence, and, by admitting the evidence, necessarily
concluded that it was. Regardless, any error by the district court was harmless.

B.

Standard Of Review
Under Idaho Rule of Evidence 609(a) the trial court must apply a two-prong test to

determine whether evidence of the prior conviction should be admitted: (1) the trial court must
determine whether the fact or nature of the conviction is relevant to the witness’ credibility; and
(2) if so, the trial court determines whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs its
prejudicial effect. State v. Thompson, 132 Idaho 628, 630, 977 P.2d 890, 892 (1999) (citing State
v. Bush, 131 Idaho 22, 30, 951 P.2d 1249, 1257 (1997)).
When the appellate court reviews the trial court’s decision as to the first prong, concerning
relevance, the standard of review is de novo. Id. (citing Bush, 131 Idaho 22, 30, 951 P.2d 1249,
1257; State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 766, 864 P.2d 596, 604 (1993)). The appellate court
reviews the trial court’s decision as to the second prong, concerning whether the probative value
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of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect, for an abuse of discretion. Id. (citing Bush, 131
Idaho at 31, 951 P.2d at 1258).
When reviewing an exercise of discretion on appeal, the appellate court considers: (1)
whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the court
acted within the outer bounds of such discretion and consistently with legal standards applicable
to specific choices; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Id.
(citing Bush, 131 Idaho at 31, 951 P.2d at 1258; State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d
1331, 1333 (1989)).

C.

The District Court Implicitly Determined That The Probative Value Of Giltz’s Prior
Burglary Convictions Outweighed Their Prejudicial Effect
Prior to trial, the state gave notice that it intended to impeach Giltz, pursuant to Idaho Rule

of Evidence 609, based upon his two prior convictions for burglary. (R., pp.74-75.) At a pre-trial
hearing, the district court ruled that Giltz’s burglary convictions were relevant to the issue of
credibility, but made no express ruling relative to prejudice. (Tr., p.15, L.17 – p.17, L.5.) 1 The
court specifically ruled that the “fact of the felony” could be admitted by the state, but left it “to
the defense to decide whether or not they want the nature of the felony conviction disclosed to the
jury.” (Tr., p.17, Ls.6-25.)
On direct examination Giltz was asked, “And at some point in the past, have you been
convicted of a felony?”, and he answered, “Yes, I have.” (Tr., p. 294, Ls.16-18.) The district court
then sua sponte instructed the jury:
Ladies and Gentlemen, you’ve just heard evidence that the defendant has a
previous conviction. That may be considered by you only as it may affect the

1

The transcripts of the motion hearing, jury trial, and sentencing hearing are all in one
continuously numbered transcript.
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defendant’s believability as a witness. You must not consider it as evidence of the
defendant’s guilt of the charge in this case.
(Tr., p.294, L.22 – p.295, L.2.)
No other mention of Giltz’s prior convictions was made until the prosecutor’s last question
during cross-examination, when she asked Giltz, “And you testified that you have been twice
convicted of felonies; is that right?” (Tr., p.339, Ls.1-2.) When Giltz responded, “I’ve been
convicted of a felony[,]” the prosecutor asked, “Twice?”, and Giltz answered, “Yes.” (Tr., p.339,
Ls.3-5.)
On appeal, Giltz does not challenge the district court’s determination that his prior burglary
convictions met the relevance prong of Rule 609. (Appellant’s Brief, p.8 (“[T]he district court
correctly concluded Mr. Giltz’s prior convictions for burglary had some relevance to the issue of
credibility.”).) Instead Giltz contends the court “did not consider whether the probative value of
[his] prior convictions outweighed their prejudicial impact.” (Id., p.7.)
Idaho Rule of Evidence 609(a) states:
(a) General Rule. For the purposes of attacking a witness’s character for
truthfulness, evidence of the fact that the witness has been convicted of a felony
and the nature of the felony shall be admitted if elicited from the witness or
established by public record, but only if the court determines in a hearing
outside the presence of the jury that the fact of the prior conviction or the nature
of the prior conviction, or both, are relevant to the witness’s character for
truthfulness and that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs
its prejudicial effect to the party offering the witness. If the evidence of the fact
of a prior felony conviction, but not the nature of the conviction, is admitted
for the purpose of impeachment of a party to the action or proceeding, the party
shall have the option to present evidence of the nature of the conviction, but
evidence of the circumstances of the conviction shall not be admissible.
I.R.E. 609(a) (emphasis added).
Although the district court did not expressly rule that the probative value of Giltz’s two
felony convictions outweighed their prejudicial effect, it appears the court implicitly considered
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both factors. Just before the court rendered a general analysis of Rule 609, defense counsel
explained that burglary is considered a “category two” offense as described in State v. Ybarra, 102
Idaho 573, 634 P.2d 435 (1981) – one which ‘“might be relevant if the State can show a pattern
[of] disrespect for law and lawful authority.’” (Tr., p.12, Ls.13-19 (loosely quoting State v. Allen,
113 Idaho 676, 678, 747 P.2d 85, 87 (Ct. App. 1987) (explaining Ybarra’s three categories of
crimes relevant to Rule 609)).) Defense counsel then discussed the danger of unfair prejudice
associated with the admission of prior convictions under Rule 609:
But, further, as the Allen court points out, there is a real danger of unfair
prejudice from bringing out the fact that somebody has a felony conviction. All of
a sudden, they are branded the felon in the courtroom and can be convicted just due
to, I guess, bad character. There is a real – a manifest and substantial potential for
unfair prejudice, which is the language from Allen.
(Tr., p.12, L.24 – p.13, L.7.) The district court responded to defense counsel’s comments about
the relevance and prejudice prongs of Rule 609 as follows:
Some convictions bear very closely on the issue of credibility and veracity, and that
is, things like forgery and perjury convictions, for example, while other crimes of
violence really tell us little or nothing about the credibility of a witness. And the
danger with prior felonies is that a jury will be influenced by the fact of the prior
felony and not use it for aiding them in determining a witness’s credibility, but
rather as a witness’s propensity to commit crimes and so that it comes in as – that
the jury will treat it as propensity – prohibited propensity evidence, is essentially
the concern. And both Ybarra and Allen, State versus Allen, I think, tend to throw
burglary kind of into that middle ground.
I don’t know what the circumstances of the prior burglary conviction are.
The rule is quite clear that that’s irrelevant, as least as far as evidentiary value goes.
And, to me, there is a distinction between a burglary that consists of someone
caught shoplifting at Walmart versus someone who is breaking into a home with
the intent of committing a theft. They are the same crime. They are both theft
crimes, but one of them somehow, to me, seems more reflective of disrespect for
law and the rights of others and a willingness to – I guess, it looks more like
someone, I guess – to me, it says more about credibility – would have more bearing
on the issue of credibility. I am not articulating it very well.
But the rule is clear that that doesn’t matter. It’s just the name that we have
put on the particular crime and not how that crime was committed.
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I will allow the convictions in as impeachment. I do find that burglary
carries with it – it is a theft. . . .
....
I will allow it. I will leave it to the defense to decide whether or not they
want the nature of the felony conviction disclosed to the jury.
(Tr., p.14, L.6 – p.17, L.9 (emphasis added).)
Admittedly, the district court did not expressly make a ruling on whether the probative
value of Giltz’s two felony convictions outweighed their prejudicial effect. However, after
discussing the relevance factor, the court explained the danger inherent in admitting a prior felony
into evidence, which, combined with its decision to admit the fact of the felony convictions, shows
that the court implicitly found the probative value of the evidence outweighed any prejudice. Giltz
has failed to show that the court abused its discretion in admitting, for impeachment purposes, the
fact that he had been convicted of two felonies.

D.

Even If The District Court Abused Its Discretion, The Error Was Harmless
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it implicitly determined that the

probative value of admitting evidence that Giltz had been convicted of two felonies (burglary)
outweighed any prejudicial effect. However, even if the district court abused its discretion, the
error was harmless. “Where a defendant alleges error at trial that he contemporaneously objected
to, this Court reviews the error on appeal under the harmless error test.” State v. Almaraz, 154
Idaho 584, 600-601, 301 P.3d 242, 258-259 (2013) (citation omitted). “[T]he error is harmless if
the Court finds that the result would be the same without the error.” Id. at 598, 301 P.3d at 256
(citation omitted).
The only evidence presented to the jury regarding Giltz’s prior convictions was his
testimony that he had been convicted of a “felony” twice. (Tr., p.294, Ls.16-18; p.339, Ls.1-5.)
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Although the court gave Giltz the option of informing the jury of the specific charge, he chose not
to do so. (Tr., p.17, Ls.6-9.) In short, the jury was told nothing – not even the name of the offenses
– about Giltz’s past two felony convictions. 2 The court sua sponte gave a limiting instruction
directing the jury that evidence of Giltz’s prior convictions “may be considered by you only as it
may affect the defendant’s believability as a witness. You must not consider it as evidence of the
defendant’s guilt of the charge in this case.” (Tr., p.294, L.24 – p.295, L.2.) The court clearly
recognized, and tried to ameliorate, any prejudicial effect of the evidence by instructing the jury it
could only consider such evidence for a proper purpose. “[I]t is presumed that the jury follows a
limiting instruction.” State v. Pugsley, 128 Idaho 168, 175, 911 P.2d 761, 768 (Ct. App. 1995).
See also State v. Gomez, 151 Idaho 146, 156, 254 P.3d 47, 57 (Ct. App. 2011) (“We presume that
the jury followed the district court’s [limiting] instructions.”).
Moreover, while the case against Giltz may have been a “he said, she said” matter in regard
to whether L.B. did anything to warrant his engaging in self-defense (see Appellant’s Brief, p.l0),
the serious injuries L.B. sustained completely belie any assertion that Giltz used reasonable force
against her – even assuming, arguendo, some degree of self-defense was warranted (see Tr. p.268,
L.12 – p.289, L.13 (Dr. Ashley King’s testimony); St. Exs. 3, 6 through 23). Based on the facts
presented at trial as set forth in the Statement of Facts herein, and relied upon here, the district
court’s limiting instruction to the jury (Tr., p.294, L.22 – p.295, L.2), and State’s Exhibits 1
through 23 (especially the photos of L.B.’s face), the evidence presented at trial establishing that
Giltz was guilty of domestic battery with traumatic injury was overwhelming; therefore, this Court

2

The certified copies of the judgments of Giltz’s two prior burglaries were admitted into evidence
during his bench trial on the persistent violator allegation. (Tr., p.444, L.17 – p.447, L.21; see R.,
pp.96-97 (Part II of the Information).)
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should conclude that the result of Giltz’s jury trial “would be the same without the error.” Almaraz,
154 Idaho at 598, 301 P.3d at 256.
II.
Giltz Has Failed To Show Any Error In The District Court’s Instruction To The Jury That It Was
Not Necessary To Decide Whether He Struck The Victim With An Open Or Closed Fist
A.

Introduction
On appeal, Giltz argues that the district court’s oral instruction to the jury, in response to

its questions about the necessity of finding whether Giltz used a closed fist, “was inconsistent with
the charging instrument and thus created a variance. The variance was fatal because it violated
Mr. Giltz’s right to fair notice of the charge against him.” (Appellant’s Brief, p.12.) Giltz’s
argument fails.
First, Giltz never argued to the district court that its oral instruction to the jury created a
variance that deprived him of notice of the basis of the charge. As such, Giltz failed to preserve
this argument for appeal. Second, even if the issue is considered on appeal, Giltz has failed to
show he was deprived of fair notice of the charge against him by a variance between the charging
document and the court’s oral instruction to the jury.

B.

Standard Of Review
Whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which this Court exercises

free review. State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 710, 215 P.3d 414, 430 (2009). “An error in jury
instructions only constitutes reversible error when the instruction misled the jury or prejudiced the
party challenging the instruction.” Id. (citation omitted). “If the instructions, considered as a
whole, fairly and adequately present the issues and state the applicable law, then no error has been
committed.” Id. (quotations, citation and brackets omitted).
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C.

Background
In order to adequately address this “variance” issue, it is necessary to retrace the lengthy

flow of the arguments and positions taken by the court and parties leading to the court’s oral
instruction to the jury in response to its questions about whether, to convict Giltz, it must find that
he used a closed fist when he struck L.B.
The state charged Giltz in an Information with felony domestic violence, alleging he
punched L.B. “in the face with a closed fist, and by committing said battery, did inflict a traumatic
injury” to her, “to wit: fracture(s) to [L.B.’s] nose and/or cheekbones(s), a laceration to the bridge
of her nose, bruising and swelling to her cheeks and around her eyes and her lip, and where the
defendant and [L.B.] are household members.” (R., pp.50-51 (emphasis added).) At the start of
the jury trial, the court read the charge section of the Information to the jury. (Tr., p.121, L.22 –
p. 122, L.21; see R., p.116 (Jury Instr. No. 2).) At the end of the trial, Jury Instruction No. 14
informed the jury that in order to convict Giltz of felony domestic battery, the state must prove,
inter alia, that he “committed a battery upon [L.B.] by punching [L.B.] in the face with a closed
fist.” (R., p.130, #3.)
During jury deliberations, the jury sent out a set of questions for the court, which read:
How important is the “closed fist” wording in #3 of Instruction #14?
Are we determining whether the initial hit or we believe secondary hits were done
with a closed fist?
Is a closed fist equivelant [sic] to an open fist?
(R., p.140.)
Outside the presence of the jury, the trial court and parties discussed the jury’s questions,
and, in responding to the prosecutor’s comments, the court introduced the “variance” issue and
explained that merely referring the jury to the instructions was not sufficient to resolve the matter:
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I don’t think I can do that in this case, not given the nature of the question.
That’s not going to resolve it, because the issue is clearly a variance between the
exact language in the information, which I used in the charging instruction, and the
two different versions of the same thing that happened at the time that nobody
disputes.
She was hit in the face. The State for whatever reason, chose to charge it
as “hit with a closed fist.” The defendant has, essentially, testified to all of the
elements of the charge but with justification. And leaving the jury to scratch their
head over that part of it, I don’t think is appropriate. So I think we have to give an
answer other than go back and reread the instruction, because I trust they have
followed my instructions and have already pondered that.
(Tr., p.434, L.11 – p.435, L.3 (emphasis added).) The prosecutor pointed out that the element the
state had to prove was “that the defendant committed a battery upon her[,]” and the court agreed.
(Tr., p.435, Ls.18-23.) However, the court said it was inclined to tell the jury that, “for purposes
of this case, it is not necessary for you to determine whether the defendant struck with an open or
closed fist, and leave it at that.” (Tr., p.436, Ls.5-10.)
Giltz’s trial counsel said that “the trouble is, if we go outside the instructions, what we’re
essentially doing is handing them additional things that neither [the prosecutor] or I can address
with them in closing.” (Tr., p.436, Ls.11-15.) The court, on its own, then re-introduced the
“variance” issue, stating:
So you’re suggesting that, if the jury determines that the blow was struck
with an open fist as opposed to a closed fist, that the crime wasn’t committed and
that the defendant should walk free? Is that your suggestion, Mr. Schou? Because
you’re talking about a variance between the pleadings and the proof, essentially.
(Tr., p.436, Ls.18-25 (emphasis added).) Giltz’s trial counsel responded:
And essentially what I’m arguing, Your Honor, is that I don’t know how
the jury is going to interpret these things. I think the jury instructions are clear as
they sit. And I am not going to have the opportunity to discuss any additional
instruction. That’s essentially my concern.
(Tr., p.437, Ls.1-7.) The prosecutor said she agreed with the court that, “whether the fist was open
or closed, it does not matter insofar as they determined a battery occurred.” (Tr., p.437, Ls.9-13.)
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Giltz’s trial counsel replied, “[b]ased on what [the prosecutor] said, I think directly [sic] 15 gets
you there[,]” and “I think directing them to Instruction No. 15 gets you there. I mean, it tells them
what a battery is.” (Tr., p.437, Ls.20-25; see R., p.131 (Jury Instr. No. 15 (“A ‘battery’ is
committed when a person willfully and unlawfully uses force or violence upon the person of
another.”).) The court and Giltz’s trial counsel then engaged in the following colloquy:
THE COURT: My concern with that is it doesn’t pose – it doesn’t answer the
question they have posed. I don’t think they are confused over what a battery is; I
think they are confused about by [sic] an instruction that tells them – that recites
the language in the information. And then that brings us to the next question as to
whether or not the language in the information is a necessary element of the crime.
And in this case, I don’t believe that that additional statement is an element of the
crime, the closed fist. It’s the striking.
So with that, and taking into account the comments of counsel, I am still
going to instruct the jury that, for purposes of this case, they need not decide
between a closed fist or an open fist. Now, I told you the language that I am – but
I am open to suggestions on how to phrase it.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Is the Court going to say, “For the purpose of this case,
you do not have to decide between whether it was a closed fist or open fist”?
THE COURT: Right. I will say, “It’s not necessary for you to decide.” Or, “You
don’t need to decide,” how – whatever you think would be make more sense. Either
way.
MR. SCHOU: Judge, I think I have lodged the objection that I have to this in
general. I think the specific language you proposed is fine.
(Tr., p.438, L.1 – p.439, L.5 (emphasis added).) The court orally instructed the jury, “For the
purposes of this case, it is not necessary for you to decide whether the defendant struck with an
open or closed fist.” (Tr., p.439, Ls.20-25.)

D.

Giltz Failed To Preserve His Variance And Lack Of Notice Claim For Appeal
“It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely objection must be made

in the court below before an issue is preserved for appeal. The specific ground for the objection
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must also be clearly stated.” State v. Gleason, 130 Idaho 586, 592, 944 P.2d 721, 727 (Ct. App.
1997) (citing I.R.E. 103(a)(1); State v. Babb, 125 Idaho 934, 940, 877 P.2d 905 (1994)). “For an
objection to be preserved for appellate review, either the specific ground for the objection must be
clearly stated, or the basis of the objection must be apparent from the context.” State v. Almaraz,
154 Idaho 584, 602, 301 P.3d 242, 260 (2013) (quoting State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 277, 77
P.3d 956, 966 (2003)).
The Idaho Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed these longstanding preservation
principles, holding that “[i]ssues not raised below will not be considered by this court on appeal,
and the parties will be held to the theory upon which the case was presented to the lower court.”
State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271, 275, 396 P.3d 700, 704 (2017) (citations omitted).
Thus, even where application of the correct legal standard would show error by the district court,
if that standard was not argued to the district court the appellate court will not reverse. See Id. at
275-76, 396 P.3d at 704-05 (rejecting a “wrong result-wrong theory” approach and refusing to
reverse the district court by application of the correct legal theory).

This is because it is

“‘manifestly unfair’” to ask the appellate court to decide a question the party failed to present to
the trial court. Id. at 276, 396 P.3d at 705 (quoting Smith v. Sterling, 1 Idaho 128, 131 (1867)).
For the first time on appeal, Giltz argues that the district court’s oral instruction to the jury,
in response to its questions about the necessity of finding whether Giltz used a closed fist, “was
inconsistent with the charging instrument and thus created a variance. The variance was fatal
because it violated Mr. Giltz’s right to fair notice of the charge against him.” (Appellant’s Brief,
p.12.) Because this is not the theory on which Giltz objected to the court below, the issue was not
preserved and this Court should decline to consider it. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho at 275-276,
396 P.3d 704-705.
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Although the trial court mentioned “variance” sua sponte (either directly or indirectly)
several times after the jury sent the court its questions, Giltz’s trial counsel never did the same.
When the issue of how to best respond to the jury’s questions arose, Giltz’s trial counsel said that,
if the court was going to tell the jury that it did not make any difference whether Giltz used an
open or closed fist to batter L.B., his concern was that neither he nor the prosecutor would “have
the opportunity to discuss any additional instruction.” (Tr., p.437, Ls.1-7; see Tr., p.436, Ls. 1117 (“[W]hat we’re essentially doing is handing them additional things that neither [the prosecutor]
or I can address with them in closing.”).) After the trial court said that it would tell the jury ‘“It’s
not necessary for you to decide[,]’ [o]r ‘You don’t need to decide,’ how – whatever you think
would make more sense[,]” (Tr., p.438, L.24 – p.439, L.2), Giltz’s attorney said:
Judge, I think I have lodged the objection that I have to this in general. I
think the specific language you proposed is fine.
(Tr., p.439, Ls.3-5.) Therefore, Giltz’s trial counsel did not object due to any potential variance
problem and did not claim any lack of notice; he only contended that he and the prosecutor would
not “have the opportunity to discuss any additional instruction.” (Tr., p.437, Ls.5-7.) That
argument could have been made in regard to any additional instruction the court was considering
– it was not made specific to any variance allegation or objection.
Moreover, Glitz’s trial counsel agreed with the prosecutor’s comments that Jury Instruction
15 – defining “battery” (which makes no distinction in how the offense is committed) – “gets you
there” and “tells them what a battery is.” (Tr., p.437, Ls.20-25; see R., p.131.) By agreeing with
the prosecutor that any confusion created by the “closed fist” charging language could be rectified
by the jury being referred to Instruction No. 15, Giltz’s trial counsel necessarily agreed that Giltz
could be convicted of felony domestic battery for striking L.B. with an open hand (assuming the
other elements were proven true); counsel certainly did not object to such a possibility, much less
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claim that he lacked notice based upon a variance. Because Giltz did not raise a variance objection
below, the issue was not preserved and this Court should decline to consider it. Garcia-Rodriguez,
162 Idaho at 275-76, 396 P.3d 704-05.

E.

Even If The Issue Is Considered, Giltz Has Failed To Show That There Was A Fatal
Variance
Assuming that Giltz preserved the issue for appeal, he has failed to show that his due

process right to fair notice was violated by a variance between the charging document and the trial
court’s oral jury instruction.
“A variance arises when the evidence adduced at trial establishes facts different from those
alleged in the indictment.” Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 105 (1979). A variance also
occurs where the jury instructions given at trial allow the jury to convict the defendant of the
charged crime, but on one or more alternative theories than alleged in the charging document. See,
e.g., State v. Windsor, 110 Idaho 410, 716 P.2d 1182 (1985); State v. Montoya, 140 Idaho 160,
166, 90 P.3d 910, 916 (Ct. App. 2004). Not all variances are fatal: “[T]here is a marked distinction
between a ‘mere variance’ and a variance which is automatically fatal because it amounts to an
impermissible ‘constructive amendment.’” State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 41, 49, 89 P.3d 881, 889 (Ct.
App. 2003) (quoting State v. Colwell, 124 Idaho 560, 565-566, 861 P.2d 1225, 1230-1231 (Ct.
App. 1993)). A variance between the information used to charge a defendant and the instructions
given at trial constitutes a due process violation if it deprives a defendant of fair notice of the
charges against him or subjects him to a risk of double jeopardy. Montoya, 140 Idaho at 164-66,
90 P.3d at 914-16. A defendant is deprived of fair notice only if he was misled or embarrassed in
the preparation or presentation of his defense. State v. Hickman, 146 Idaho 178, 182, 191 P.3d
1098, 1103 (2008).
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Here, Giltz only asserts that he was denied fair notice that he could be convicted of felony
domestic battery even if the jury found that he used an open hand (or open fist) to inflict traumatic
injury upon L.B. As explained above, this requires Giltz to show that he was somehow misled or
embarrassed in the preparation or presentation of his defense, which he has failed to do. See
Hickman, 146 Idaho at 182, 191 P.3d at 1103. Giltz relies upon State v. Brazil, 136 Idaho 327, 33
P.3d 218 (Ct. App. 2001), which in turn relied upon State v. Sherrod, 131 Idaho 56, 951 P.2d 1283
(Ct. App. 1998), to support his claim that the alleged variances between the Information and the
jury instructions were fatal because he was deprived of fair notice that he could be convicted for
felony domestic battery if he used his open hand. (Appellant’s Brief, pp.15-16.) A review of these
cases, however, shows that Giltz’s reliance is misplaced.
Brazil kidnapped his victim, physically assaulted her and shot her finger twice. The
variance occurred when the state admitted evidence of several additional acts of physical violence
by Brazil that caused injuries – other than the two charged aggravated batteries for shooting her
finger – which could have been found to be aggravated batteries. Brazil, 136 Idaho at 330, 33 P.3d
at 221. Sherrod and others attacked the victim, beating him savagely and stabbing him. Sherrod
was charged with aggravated battery by stabbing the victim with a knife. The jury, however,
actually acquitted him of using a deadly weapon, and therefore must have found him guilty for the
beating instead of the stabbing as charged. Sherrod, 131 Idaho at 60, 951 P.2d at 1287. In both
Brazil and Sherrod, therefore, there were entirely different injuries and uncharged criminal acts
that could have been the basis of the respective convictions. In contrast to those cases, where the
evidence showed that the defendant both poisoned and suffocated the victim, the jury did not need
to decide if the single crime of murder was accomplished by suffocation or poisoning. State v.
Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 712, 215 P.3d 414, 432 (2009) (“Absent evidence of more than one
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instance in which Severson engaged in the charged conduct, the jury was not required to
unanimously agree on the facts giving rise to the offense.”). Because Giltz indisputably inflicted
the traumatic injuries to L.B.’s face (just as Severson indisputably killed his victim) by striking
her with his hand, it does not matter if he hit her with a closed fist, or, as he testified, he “openpalmed her with one hand.” (Tr., p.300, L.25 – p.301, L.1.)
Moreover, Giltz has also failed to show that the variance deprived him of fair notice by
causing him to be misled or embarrassed in the preparation of his defense. See Windsor, 110 Idaho
at 417-18, 716 P.2d at 1189-90; Hickman, 146 Idaho at 182, 191 P.3d at 1103. Giltz argues that
“[h]e entered a plea of not guilty, and proceeded to trial, because he struck his girlfriend with an
open palm, in self-defense.” (Appellant’s Brief, p.15.) Although Giltz may have proceeded to
trial in order to present his defense of self-defense, the record shows he was not, and could not
have been, surprised or embarrassed by the fact that he could be convicted for using an open hand
to batter L.B.
Giltz clearly raised the affirmative defense of self-defense during trial. 3 By affirmatively
asserting self-defense, Giltz necessarily admitted that he could be found guilty of felony domestic
battery if the jury did not agree that he battered L.B. (causing traumatic injuries) in reasonable
self-defense. State v. McKeehan, 91 Idaho 808, 821, 430 P.2d 886, 899 (Idaho 1967) (“The

3

Giltz’s trial counsel’s last comments to the jury during opening statement were, “Ladies and
Gentlemen, at the close of this case, I am going to ask you to find that William acted reasonably
and in self-defense when he struck [L.B.]. I am going to ask you to return a not guilty verdict.
(Tr., p.140, Ls.2-6.) During the defense case-in-chief, Giltz testified that he struck L.B., albeit
with an open hand or palm, while defending himself from her attempts to stab him with a sharp
object. (See generally Tr., p.293, L.22 – p.339, L.7.) Jury Instructions 17, 18, and 19 instructed
the jury on self-defense. (R., pp.133-135.) Finally, at the end of his closing argument, defense
counsel told the jury, “If you have any lingering doubts about [L.B.’s] story, if you believe it's
possible, a real possibility, that William was attacked and that William was just defending himself,
there is only one verdict you can reach and that's not guilty.” (Tr., p.411, Ls.9-14.)
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justifiable or excusable cause referred to in the statute ([former] I.C. § 18-912) means the act
complained of is justifiable or excusable if done in self defense or by mistake.”); Baker v. 221 N.
9 St. Corp., 2010 WL 3824167, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2010) (“Generally, self-defense is an
admission of, and defense to, an intentional act.”); Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Tunkle, 997 F. Supp.
1356, 1360 (D. Mont. 1998) (“Self-defense requires an admission of acting in a certain way. But,
the conduct admitted is not a violation of the law. It is seeking a factual determination that certain
conduct is legally justified.”); see also Jean K. Gilles Phillips, Elizabeth Cateforis, Self-Defense:
What’s A Jury Got to Do with It?, 57 U. Kan. L. Rev. 1143, 1173 (2009) (“Because self-defense
generally requires admission of the acts that constitute the crime, if a jury finds the defendant
appropriately used force in self-defense, then the defendant’s action is justified and she is
acquitted.”); Robert P. Mosteller, Discovery Against the Defense: Tilting the Adversarial Balance,
74 Cal. L. Rev. 1567, 1685 (1986) (“In a homicide or assault case, for example, the state could use
the notice of self-defense as an admission by the defendant proving his identity as the person who
inflicted the injury.”). By asserting self-defense, Giltz effectively admitted to the jury that, unless
it found he was justified to do so, he committed felony domestic battery. 4 Giltz’s self-defense
claim indicates that he understood he could be convicted of felony domestic battery even if the
jury believed he struck L.B. with an open palm.
When the jury’s questions were being considered, Giltz’s trial counsel agreed with the
prosecutor that referring the jury to Jury Instruction No. 15, defining “battery,” was all that needed
to be done, by telling the jury “what a battery is.” (Tr., p.437, Ls.20-25; see R., p.131.) In turn,
Jury Instruction No. 15 says nothing about how a “battery” is specifically accomplished, only that

4

There was no question that L.B. suffered traumatic injuries to her face. (See R., p.130
(“Traumatic injury” means a condition of the body, such as a wound or external or internal injury,
whether of a minor or serious nature, caused by physical force.”).)
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it is “committed when a person willfully and unlawfully uses force or violence upon the person of
another.” (R., p.131.) Clearly, a person can use an open hand to inflict “force or violence” upon
another. By joining the prosecutor’s request in asking that the jury be referred to Jury Instruction
No. 15, Giltz’s trial counsel showed that he knew the relevant question for the jury was whether
Giltz committed a battery – not whether he struck L.B. with a closed fist.
Further, Jury Instruction No. 15 says nothing about how a defendant must have inflicted
“force or violence upon the person of another” in order to be convicted of “battery.” Therefore, it
essentially told the jury, by inference, the same thing the judge did – “it is not necessary for you
to decide whether the defendant struck with an open or closed fist.” (Tr., p.439, Ls.23-25.) Having
urged, in effect, the same response to the jury’s questions that the trial court gave, Giltz’s trial
counsel showed that he was not embarrassed or misled in the preparation of the defense –
especially when the self-defense claim inherently admitted the facts of the underlying crime (albeit
with a justification).
Giltz has failed to demonstrate that any variance between the language of the charging
document and the trial court’s oral instruction to the jury in response to its questions deprived him
of fair notice by causing him to be misled or embarrassed in the preparation of his defense.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment and sentence entered
upon the jury verdict finding Giltz guilty of felony domestic battery.
DATED this 21st day of December, 2018.

/s/ John C. McKinney
JOHN C. McKINNEY
Deputy Attorney General
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